1918
US railroad trackage (in miles): 231,303.36
US freight equipment: 2,320,216
US length of haul (average in miles): 175.41
US rate per ton-mile (average): .00848
[Loree, pp. 274-5]
US revenue tons carried one mile: 398,442,019,620
US average miles per car per day: 24.9 (b)
US average car capacity (in tons): 41
US average tons handled per loaded car: 65.56
US percent of average tons per car to average capacity: 62.50
US aggregate car capacity (in tons): 96,545,239
(b) via USRA
[Loree, p. 278]
US average tons per train: 628
[Daggett, pp. 668-69, via Annual Report, 1924, ICC, pp. 105-06]
US railroad employment: 1,841,575
US railroad compensation: $2,613,813,351
US average compensation per hour: .458
US average compensation per employee: $1,419
(Includes General and Divisional Officers)
[Daggett, p. 660, via Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways in
the United States, ICC, 1922, p. xxi]
US railroad workers killed on the job: 2,759
US railroad workers injured on the job: 46,961
[Loree, p. 645]
USRA price for rental (12 months): $965,788,896.97
[Daggett, p. 648]
Revenue freight tonnage by classes of commodities, 1918, via ICC
Products of:
Agriculture: 228,322,331--9.9 percent
Animals: 61,404,525--2.66 percent
Mines: 1,263,502,734--54.76 percent
Forests: 192,616,711--8.35 percent
Manufacturers: 377,366,031--16.36 percent
Miscellaneous: 85,645,364--3.71
LCL: 98,368,439--4.26
[Loree, p. 293]
''If, however, the mileage per car per day had been speeded up to 26.9
(as in 1916), the available equipment would, under like operating
conditions, have handled more than 433,000,000,000 tons, or an
increase of 8.74 percent.'' [Loree, p. 270]
''Tons handled one mile in the years 1917 and 1918 [were] more than
100,000,000,000 above any one year of the years 1906 to 1915,
inclusive, with the exception of the year 1913, which is exceeded by
approximately 93,000,000,000.'' [Loree, p. 271]
The Bureau of Railway Economics, as cited by Loree, came up with the
following information for freight car travel that year. The average
trip consisted of 18.05 days, with 11.66 days in the hands of the
railroads and 6.39 days in the hands of the shippers and consignees.
The largest portion of the railroads share was consumed by 'Abnormal
delays-Other causes as reflected in accumulations' 3.28 days. 1.97
days were spent in normal road movement, with .68 of a day in road
delays. The largest portion of the shippers and consignees share was
consumed with loading and unloading, four days, the same number as
Loree cited for 1910. The car fleet at that time stood at about
2,939,963, as its not clear if the table includes cars out of service
for repairs. [Loree, p. 268]
Loree adds to the figures for that year, stating that the war-time
effort to increase the loading of cars drove the average up to 65.56
percent of capacity. [Loree, p. 270]
January 18
McAdoo appoints Secretary of the Interior and former ICC member
Franklin K. Lane to head the Railroad Wage Commission to investigate
wages and working conditions on US railroads. [Stover, p. 191]
Spring
McAdoo divides railroads into three regions: East--east of Chicago and
north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers; West--west of Chicago and the
Mississippi River; South--East of the Mississippi River and south of
the Ohio and Potomac Rivers. Alfred H. Smith President New York
Central System, appointed Regional Director of the Eastern Region.
[Stover, pp. 189-90]
Operational changes: duplicate passenger services eliminated; sleeping
car service curtailed and additional surcharge added; limited trains
obligated to handle local traffic. Consolidation of timetables, ticket
offices, single ticket book for all roads under USRA control. Joint
use of terminals, shops and other equipment. Closing of traffic
offices. Though passenger service reductions, passenger traffic
increased by eight percent.
[Stover, p. 190]
New equipment ordered: 100,000 new freight cars and 1,930 locomotives,
at a cost of $380 million (see Revolving Fund under March 21). ''...but
freight car shortages were a thing of the past by the late spring of
1918.'' [Stover, p. 191]
The freight cars, according to Loree, broke down to: 25,000
single-sheath box of 100,000 pounds capacity; 25,000 double-sheath box
of 80,000 pounds capacity; 5,000 low side gondolas of 140,000 pounds
capacity; 20,000 drop-bottom gondolas of 100,000 pounds capacity;
25,000 hopper-bottom gondolas of 110,000 pounds capacity. [Loree, p.
303]
An interesting take on the effectiveness of the USRA versus the ARA in
this matter comes from the SP's Krutschnitt as cited by Loree: 'After
years of fruitless activity, the life of the ARA Committee on Standard
Box Car[s] was terminated with federal control. At the close of 1917,
the Committee was divided in the consideration of two designs; one
prepared by its sub-committee was estimated to weigh 46,000 pounds,
and another, carefully proportioned by competent engineers to safely
stand all stresses imposed by prescribed specifications, to weigh
40,738 pounds...' Kruttschnitt went on to heap a bit of scorn on the
USRA as well, stating their design 'weight 16.3 percent or 3.3 tons
more than a possible on of equal load and space capacity, hence we may
expect an increase in its initial cost of about 16.3 percent.'
'Center sills, draft sills, side steel, under- and end-framing, roof,
doors, floor, trucks, etc., can be built lighter...and in many cases
materially stronger.'
'The cost of hauling the excess 3.3 tons causes unnecessary and easily
avoidable expense of millions of dollars per annum which might be
saved by the elimination of useless dead weight.'
'A train of 40 [USRA] box cars loaded to 55 tons, contains 2,200 tons
paying load and weight 944 tons; 42 carefully designed cars will carry
2,310 tons and will weigh 853 tons, an excess of paying freight over
the others of 110 tons. As the total weight of the two trains is the
same, the cost of running them will be the same, but the 110 tons of
additional paying freight, the haul of which is made possible by
elimination of unnecessary dead weight, would bring in a revenue at
existing ton mileage rates of $1.10 per train mile, every cent of
which would be net. This is substantially ten percent more than the
net earnings of the train of [USRA] cars.'
'We ascertained in the latter part of 1917 that the car which we
contrast with the [USRA] car could have been built for between $2,300
and $2,400. The [USRA] box contracted for in the early part of 1918
cost $3,050.' [Loree, pp. 303-4]
An implicit lesson in railroading, engineering, and bad design to be
sure.
According to Daggett, the curtailment of traffic expenses, defined as
the outlay for solicitation, advertising, industrial and immigration
bureaus, and the cost of employing these staffs rose, fell, and
climbed to new heights between 1916 and 1922. The outlay for these
items in 1916 was $62 million, $64 million in 1917, falling to $48
million in 1918 under the USRA and cut further to $47 million in 1919,
then expanding rapidly over the next three consecutive years, to $74
million, $84 million, and $86 million respectively, a rate far above
pre-war levels. In terms of percentages of these outlays to total
operating expense, the figures were not the same. The $62 million
spent in 1916 represents 2.66 present of the total operating expense,
while the much larger $86 million of 1922 represents just 1.96
percent. [Daggett, p. 665]
March 16
The Pennsylvania extends their Sailing Days for LCL freight to cover
all 25 divisions east of Pittsburgh and Erie. Division reports show a
dialing saving of 654 cars and discontinuance of 20 local way freights
a day. [Loree, p. 375]
March 21
Railroad Control Act. Grants full protection of property rights to
railroad owners, sets annual compensation ('rental') at the average of
the net operation income of three previous years (three previous
fiscal years ending June 30, 1917), agrees to return property ''...in
substantially as good repair and in substantially as complete
equipment as it was at the beginning of Federal control.'' Revolving
fund of $500 million set up to cover initial costs. Finally, the
properties were to be returned to their owners within 21 months of the
signing of a peace treaty. [Stover, pp. 188-9]
''Inasmuch as the earnings of the last peace year-1917-seemed too high
to serve as a reasonable basis for compensation, Congress adopted the
average of the three years ending June 30, 1917, in their stead. This
included two good years and one year of light railway earnings.''
[Daggett, p. 648]
April 30
Lane's Railroad Wage Commission makes its report (the Commission was
disbanded after the report). Findings include: cost of living had
increased 40 percent between December 1915 and December 1917.
Fifty-one percent of all railroad employees were now earning less than
$75 per month. The Commission [suggested] applying wage increases to
adjust the current rate to one equal with that of December 1915 via a
sliding scale. Employees earning up to $85 per month would receive a
40 percent increase, those earning up to $100 per month would receive
a 31 percent increase, those earning up to $150 per month would
receive a 16 percent increase, with those earning $250 per month
receiving no increase at all. Current railroad employment levels were
between 1.75 and 1.8 million people.
''Many of the higher paid workers were unhappy because the new rates
did violence to the long established wage differentials in the
industry.'' [Stover, pp. 191-2]
''Urged on by [NYC's] Alfred H. Smith McAdoo decided to raise the
wages.'' [Stover, p. 191]
Thus, the average annual compensation per railroad employee rose from
$1,003 in 1917, to $1,419 in 1918, to $1,485 in 1919 and $1,820 by
1920. [Stover, p. 192]
''Their [the railroad executives] bitterness seems rather reasonable
when one recalls that the average railroad worker's annual
compensation of roughly $1,000 in 1917 was 27 percent above the
average for workers engaged in manufacturing that year. Average
railroad wages in 1920 were 33 percent above those in manufacturing.''
[Stover, p. 192]
[Note: this seems to be a direct contradiction of both Lane's Railroad
Wage Commission report, as well as figures Stover himself cites on p.
182.]
May 25
McAdoo announces General Order No. 28 an average of a 28 percent
increase in freight rates and an 18 percent increase in passenger
fares, effective June 25. Since the rate increase could note be
retroactive the increase in operating costs during 1918 were
substantially higher than the increase in total revenue. [Stover, p.
193]
''On the whole, these increases were moderate... Indeed, they were
probably less than the situation called for. Except for General Order
No. 56, increasing express rates, there was no further general advance
in rates during federal control.'' [Daggett, p. 663]
November
McAdoo retires to private life, Hines becomes Director-General.
''Wishing to help the man who had done so much for them, the railroad
workers of the country started a campaign to have each worker
contribute a dollar a year to keep McAdoo at the head of the Railroad
Administration.'' [Stover, p. 193]
''Faced with an unprecedented decline in rail traffic and record
expenses, [Hines] decided to save the national economy from the burden
of higher rates, which the rail industry clearly deserved.'' [Stover,
p. 193]